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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
This article will summarize and discuss five criminal procedure
cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit during the
survey period. The first two cases involve questions arising under the
fourth amendment, and the third case concerns rights under the fifth
amendment. The final two cases of the survey involves habeas corpus
proceedings.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT- UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES:
UNITED STATES V. RUCKMAN
A. Overview
Although the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States I stated that the
fourth amendment was intended to protect privacy interests and not
property interests, United States v. Ruckman 2 held that reference to prop-
erty interests may be necessary in specific cases to determine whether
the privacy interest is legitimate for fourth amendment protection.
B. Background
Since 1967, Katz v. United States has been the touchstone of fourth
amendment analysis. Prior to this decision, property interests governed
search and seizure analysis. 3 However, the Supreme Court in Katz
enunciated the often quoted statement: "[T]he Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places."'4 The property interest analysis was re-
placed by a two-prong privacy test set forth in Justice Harlan's concur-
ring opinion in Katz. 5 This test requires "first that a person have
1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. 806 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1986).
3. Until 1967, the fourth amendment was viewed by the courts as protecting certain
private property, not intangible privacy, interests. This analysis permitted law enforce-
ment agents to search without a warrant so long as they did not trespass on private prop-
erty in the process. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (search warrant not
required when information can be obtained without trespassing, by placing detectaphone
on outer wall of defendant's office); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927)
(speech projected beyond confines of home over telephone wires is not protected against
warrantless seizure).
4. 389 U.S. at 351. In Katz, FBI agents placed an electronic bug on a public tele-
phone booth from which Katz, a bookmaker, conducted his business. Under traditional
fourth amendment analysis, the FBI agents did not need a warrant since the telephone
booth was a public area. Id.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the notion that the fourth amendment pro-
tects only private property. The Court stated that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment Protec-
tion. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
5. Id. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reason-
able.' ",6 In practice, the first part of the test is rarely a matter of conten-
tion and, generally, the ultimate issue is whether or not the defendant's
subjective expectation of privacy is one which society is prepared to rec-
ognize as reasonable.
7
No single factor is dispositive in determining whether an individual
may legitimately claim, under the fourth amendment, that private prop-
erty should be free of government intrusion not authorized by warrant. 8
Instead, the court looks at several factors in order to assess the degree
to which such a warrantless search infringes upon individual privacy.9
These factors include the intention of the framers of the fourth amend-
ment, the uses to which the individual has put a location,' 0 and a socie-
tal understanding that certain areas deserve protection from
government invasion.11
Notwithstanding the above evolution of fourth amendment analysis,
the privacy test enunciated in Katz has not impaired the vitality of the
"open fields doctrine," which permits law enforcement officers to enter
and search open fields t2 without a warrant.' 3 The Supreme Court in Oli-
ver v. United States 14 stated that the "open fields" doctrine was consistent
with its holding in Katz because first, open fields are not included within
"persons, houses, papers, and effects,"' 15 and second, there is no socie-
tal interest in protecting the activities generally associated with open
fields. 16
C. Facts
Without a warrant, state and federal authorities searched a natural
cave located on remote government property which defendant Frank
Ruckman had been living in and around for eight months. The entrance
of the cave had been sealed by Ruckman with a wooden wall and door. 17
The authorities had gone to the cave to execute a state warrant for
6. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
7. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978).
8. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (citing Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)).
9. Id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977)).
10. Id. at 178 (citingJones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)).
11. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
12. "Open fields" is land that is beyond the area immediately surrounding the home.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1970).
13. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). Justice Holmes concluded in Hester
that "the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, is not extended to the open fields. The distinction
between the latter and the house is as old as the common law." Id. at 59.
14. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. 466 U.S. at 177-80. Its decision was consistent with Katz, explained the Court,
because society is not prepared to recognize privacy expectations in open fields as reason-
able. Id. at 178.
17. United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1472 (10th Cir. 1986). The land is
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Ruckman's arrest, which was issued when Ruckman failed to appear in
state court to answer a misdemeanor charge. Ruckman could not be
found when the authorities first arrived and searched the cave. Shortly
after the authorities found certain firearms, Ruckman appeared and was
taken into custody.
18
Eight days later, local authorities, accompanied by Bureau of Land
Management ("BLM") agents, returned to clean out the cave and found
thirteen illegal anti-personnel booby traps, resulting in charges being
brought against Ruckman. 19 At trial, Ruckman moved to suppress the
use of the anti-personnel weapons as evidence, but the motion was de-
nied 20 and thereafter the possession of the weapons formed the basis of
his conviction. 2 ' Ruckman appealed the conviction claiming that the
cave was his "home" and that the government's search thereof violated
his fourth amendment right to be free from warrantless searches.
D. Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit first rejected Ruckman's contention that the cave
was his home by holding that the cave could not be considered a perma-
nent residence. 2 2 The court concluded that Ruckman was just "camp-
ing" for an extended period of time and that the cave was not a "home"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
23
The decision, citing Katz stated that in order for the cave to come
within the ambit of fourth amendment protection, Ruckman must have
had a subjective expectation of privacy in the cave which society was
prepared to recognize as being reasonable. 24 In its analysis, the major-
ity assumed that Ruckman had such an expectation and then focused
exclusively on whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable under
the circumstances.
2 5
In concluding that Ruckman's expectation of privacy was not rea-
sonable, the majority's opinion revolved around the fact that Ruckman
was a trespasser on federal lands. The decision noted that Congress'
power over federal lands is without limitation 26 and that Ruckman was
owned by the federal government and controlled by the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM). Id. at 1472.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1471-72. The trial court, by minute order, denied the motion without any
comment. Id. at 1471.
21. Ruckman was convicted for unlawfully possessing destructive devices, within the
meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 5845(0(3), in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). 806 F.2d at 1471.
22. 806 F.2d at 1473. By arguing that the cave was his "home," Ruckman had at-
tempted to bring his claim within the literal language of the fourth amendment which
guarantees "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their 'persons, houses, papers and
effects,' against unreasonable searches and seizures .. " U.S. CONST. amend IV.
23. 806 F.2d at 1473. Counsel for Ruckman conceded that he was just "camping" in
the cave. Id.
24. 806 F.2d at 1472.
25. Id.
26. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This clause provides Congress with the authority to
make all necessary rules and regulations respecting property belonging to the United
1988]
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subject to ejectment at anytime.2 7 The fact that Ruckman may have sub-
jectively deemed the cave to be his "castle" was not decisive.2 8 The le-
gitimacy of the expectation of privacy, explained the court, is not
dependent upon whether a person chooses to conceal private activity,
but whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and
societal values protected by the fourth amendment.
29
The majority conceded that Katz is often cited for the proposition
that the fourth amendment protects people, not places, but further ex-
plained that the reasonableness of an individual's expectation of privacy
cannot be determined without reference to a place.30 As support, the court cited
Oliver v. United States3 ' in which the Supreme Court noted a distinction
between "open fields" and "certain enclaves."' 32 The greater accessibil-
ity of "open fields" in general, stated the Court, has meant that these
fields are not protected by the fourth amendment, even when the field is
surrounded by fences and "No Trespassing" signs.3 3 The fact that the
owner of an "open field" has attempted to conceal private activity is not
a controlling factor; instead the Supreme Court examines the accessibil-
ity of open fields in general.
3 4
In further support of its decision, the court in Ruckman cited a case
arising out of the First Circuit which held that squatters on public land
have no reasonable expectation of privacy. 35 The First Circuit stated
the squatters' claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy was "ludi-
crous" because the squatters knew they had no colorable claim to oc-
cupy the land.
3 6
States. Pursuant to this authority, the Bureau of Land Management can control access to
public land.
27. 806 F.2d at 1473 (citing United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940)).
28. Id. In other words, Ruckman's expectation of privacy is meaningless unless soci-
ety recognizes it as being a reasonable expectation.
29. Id. at 1474.
30. Id. The location of the property searched is a factor in determining whether legiti-
mate expectations of privacy have been violated.
31. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
32. Id. at 179-80. The Court stated that open fields do not provide the setting for
those intimate activities that the fourth amendment was intended to protect against gov-
ernment intrusion or surveillance. The Court did not define "intimate activities," but,
presumptively, they are those activities which are expected to be private and not subject to
public observation. Certain enclaves are those areas in which we normally expect intimate
activities to take place. Id. at 179.
33. Id. In discussing the general accessibility of open fields, the Court stated that "[it
is not generally true that fences or 'No Trespassing' signs effectively bar the public from
viewing open fields in rural areas." See also United States v. Rucinski, 658 F.2d 741 (10th
Cir. 1981) (although lumber yard was located in secluded mountain valley and was sur-
rounded by barbed wire and no trespassing signs, no unreasonable intrusion occurred
when government agents took pictures of the defendants' mill yard from adjacent prop-
erty), cert. deied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982).
34. Id.
35. Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
916 (1976). The squatters' homes and belongings were bulldozed after they were asked
several days earlier to leave voluntarily. Id. at 9.
36. Id. at 11. Shortly after the squatters set up a community on government land,
officials from two commonwealth agencies visited the squatters on two occasions and tried




In dissent,3 7 Judge McKay contended first, that the majority's in-
quiry into whether Ruckman's cave constituted a home within fourth
amendment protection was unnecessary; and second, that their reliance
on Ruckman's status as a trespasser was not in accordance with Katz'
elimination of property interests in fourth amendment analysis.
3 8
McKay stated that the court's inquiry into whether the cave consti-
tuted a home presupposed that only homes are protected by the fourth
amendment. 39 He held this to be untrue since the Supreme Court had
previously acknowledged that a person could have a legally sufficient
interest in a place other than his own home, and still fall within fourth
amendment protection from unreasonable government intrusion into
that place.40 McKay asserted that the ultimate issue, as in all fourth
amendment cases, was whether the defendant had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the area searched. 4 1 Although the majority addressed
this issue, McKay argued that the majority's conclusion that Ruckman's
expectation of privacy was not legitimate was incorrect because it fo-
cused on property interests, rather than privacy interests.
4 2
Without reference to trespassing and other related property inter-
ests, McKay concluded that Ruckman's expectation of privacy was both
reasonable and legitimate because the cave contained all of his belong-
ings and he had tried to seal off the entrance of the cave by constructing
a wall and door.
4 3
F. Analysis
By following precedent, the majority was correct in concluding that
reference to property interests may be necessary in determining whether
asserted privacy interests are legitimate. The Supreme Court, in focus-
ing on these reasonable expectations of privacy, has not altogether
abandoned the use of property concepts in determining the presence or
absence of privacy interests protected by the fourth amendment. 44 The
relationship between property interests and society's perception of the
reasonableness of asserted privacy interests was discussed by the Court
in Rakas v. Illinois.45 The Court explained that "one who owns or law-
37. United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1474 (10th Cir. 1986) (McKay, J.,
dissenting).
38. Id. at 1475-78 (McKay. J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1475-76 (McKay, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 1476 (McKayJ., dissenting) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)).
41. Id. (McKay, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 1478 (McKay, J., dissenting).
43. Id. (McKay, J., dissenting).
44. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984) ("The existence of a prop-
erty right is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legiti-
mate."); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 ("... by focusing on legitimate
expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether
abandoned use of property concepts in determining the presence or absence of the privacy
interests protected by that Amendment.").
45. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
fully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy by virtue of [his] right to exclude
[others]." 
46
The Supreme Court has held that this right to exclude is not dispos-
itive in every case. 4 7 Even though the person asserting the privacy inter-
est has a property interest, the Court still examines the surrounding
circumstances to determine whether the privacy interest is legitimate.4 8
In the instant case, however, the Tenth Circuit found that the Gov-
ernment's property right to exclude was dispositive of Ruckman's pri-
vacy interests. 49 This conclusion, without more, was unsupported since
the court did not examine factors other than the property rights. Nor
did the court explain why a trespasser who is subject to ejectment has no
reasonable expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court has stated that
property rights and privacy interests are not coterminous. 50 Yet in the
instant case, the Tenth Circuit concluded that government officials
could disregard Ruckman's makeshift door and search his personal be-
longings, since the officials had authority to tell Ruckman, a trespasser,
to leave.
The court's analogy to "open fields" cases was not supportive of its
decision. As Justice Powell stated in Oliver, open fields are not protected
against unwarranted searches because they do not generally provide the
setting for those intimate activities which the fourth amendment was in-
tended to protect. 5 1 The court's reference to open fields in Ruckman
was therefore incomplete, since the court did not explain why a cave
enclosed with a wall and filled with personal belongings did not provide
a setting for protected intimate activities.
Additionally, the majority's reliance on Amezquita v. Hernandez-Co-
lon 52 does not strongly support its decision in Ruckman. In Amezquita the
squatters had been asked at least twice by commonwealth officials to vol-
untarily remove their belongings, 53 and thus the court determined that
they had no reasonable expectation of privacy. 5 4 In the instant case,
there was no evidence that Ruckman had been asked to leave. Further-
more, Ruckman had been living in the cave for more than eight
months. 5 5 In light of these facts, the court should have explained why it
imputed an absence of privacy rights from the fact that Ruckman had no
46. Id. at 143 n.12.
47. See, e.g., Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152-53
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring)).
48. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
49. Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1473 ("Ruckman's subjective expectation of privacy is not
reasonable in light of the fact that he could be ousted by BLM authorities from the place
he was occupying at any time.").
50. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
51. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
52. 518 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976).
53. Id. at 11.
54. Id.
55. Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1472. Ruckman's living in the cave all this time, without
being disturbed by the government, is in contrast to the squatters in Amezquita who were
approached by government officials shortly after moving onto public land.
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possessory rights in the cave. In other words, the court failed to explain
why society believes that a trespasser has no privacy interests. More-
over, the majority's opinion failed to distinguish Ruckman from campers
who camp without permits or overstay their permit. Campers do not
own the public land upon which they camp, but would expect to be
asked to dismantle their campsites and leave before they would be sub-
jected to a warrantless search. The court's opinion in Ruckman leaves
one wondering whether campers on government property will have any
privacy interests if they remain for a period beyond their camping
permits.
5 6
II. UNITED STATES V. MABRY
A. Overview
In United States v. Mabry,57 the court held that when police are in-
volved in undercover drug purchases where the objective is to arrest the
seller's suppliers and to confiscate the contraband, a search warrant for
the supplier's home does not have to be sought until the identity of the
supplier and the location of the contraband is established to the satisfac-
tion of the police. This standard is controlling even though exigent cir-
cumstances sufficient to excuse the procurement of a search warrant are
predictable.
B. Background
Typically, police officers must go before a neutral government offi-
cial5 8 and obtain a warrant prior to a search of an individual's premises.
The warrant is granted if sufficient facts are presented demonstrating
the probability that evidence of a crime can be found in that specific
private dwelling. 5 9 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that warrant-
less searches inside a home are presumptively unreasonable. 60 How-
ever, there are some "exceptional circumstances" to this presumption
that, if met, allow the police to intrude into a private dwelling without a
search warrant.
6 1
One of the better known exceptions to the warrant requirement is
that of exigent circumstances.6 2 This exception permits police officers to
56. Id. at 1474 (McKay, J., dissenting). Judge McKay argued that the majority's deci-
sion was a threat to all campers, including senior citizens who live in recreational vehicles.
"Under the majority's sweeping language, they could be found at any time to be 'trespass-
ing' on federal lands and be stripped of any legitimate expectation of privacy in their tem-
porary dwellings." Id.
57. 809 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 33 (1987).
58. A neutral government official is a judicial officer or magistrate who is detached
from the law enforcement side of government. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971) (state attorney general is not a neutral and detached government official
for purposes of issuing search warrants).
59. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 558, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 885 (1928).
60. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
61. See United States v.Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); United States v. Erb, 596 F.2d 412
(10th Cir. 1979).
62. For other exceptions to the warrant requirement, see Chimel v. California, 395
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
enter a private dwelling for some limited purpose if the prosecution es-
tablishes that the officers have probable cause and exigent circum-
stances exist.
6 3
Probable cause to search a dwelling exists "when circumstances
known to a police officer are such as to warrant a person of reasonable
caution in the belief that a search would reveal incriminating evi-
dence." 64 Exigent circumstances exist when officers have reason to be-
lieve that criminal evidence may be destroyed6 5 or removed 6 6 before a
warrant can be obtained. In assessing whether exigent circumstances ex-
ist, the court is "guided by the realities of the situation presented by the
record."' 6 7 Courts will not attempt to second-guess the police: the cir-
cumstances are evaluated as they would appear to a prudent, cautious
and trained officer.
6 8
In United States v. Cuaron,6 9 police entered and secured the defend-
ant's home without a search warrant because they feared that he would
destroy or attempt to remove drugs. The police theorized that the fail-
ure of the defendant's carrier to return from a drug transaction, at which
he was arrested by undercover police, might give notice to the defend-
ant that problems had arisen. 7° The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit upheld the warrantless search by holding that exigent circum-
stances were created by the two or three hour time delay between the
arrest of the courier 7' and the procurement of a search warrant.
C. Facts
The defendants, John and Debra Mabry, appealed their convictions
of drug related offenses claiming that the trial court committed revers-
ible error by refusing to suppress evidence seized by government offi-
cials as a result of an unconstitutional entry into their home.72 The
U.s. 752 (1969) (after making an arrest, police may conduct a warrantless search of the
area within the defendant's (arrestee's) immediate control); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971) (evidence associated with criminal activity may be seized without a
search warrant when police are lawfully on the premises and the evidence is in plain view).
63. United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing United States
v. Erb, 596 F.2d 412, 417, 419 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 848 (1979); see, e.g., United
States v. Chavez, 812 F.2d 1295, 1298 (10th Cir. 1987).
64. United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting United
States v. Hawkins, 595 F.2d 751, 752 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 910 (1979)).
65. Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 586 (citing Erb, 596 F.2d at 418-19).
66. Id. (citing McEachin, 670 F.2d at 1144-45).
67. Id. (quoting McEachin, 670 F.2d at 1144).
68. Id.
69. 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983).
70. Id. at 585.
71. The police did not obtain a search warrant until after they had completed the drug
transaction and arrested the courier. Id.
72. United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d 671, 676 (10th Cir. 1987). The Mabrys were
jointly tried along with co-defendant Roger Sanders. The issues raised here relate only to
the Mabrys. Sanders presented only one issue on appeal-he contended that the trial
court committed reversible error by denying his requested jury instruction on entrapment.
Id.
Each of the defendants were found guilty on various counts of conspiracy to distribute
[Vol. 65:4
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Mabrys specifically sought to exclude evidence discovered by the Albu-
querque, New Mexico Police Department, after officers entered their
home without consent and conducted a protective sweep of the premises
before obtaining a search warrant.
73
The trial court concluded, and the Mabrys agreed, that the investi-
gating officers had probable cause to search the Mabrys' home and that
exigent circumstances had made the warrantless entry necessary. 7 4 The
Mabrys argued, however, that the officers involved had sufficient facts to
justify the issuance of a search warrant before any exigent circumstances
arose.7 5 On that premise, appellants specifically argued that "police in-
activity and disregard of the procedures available to obtain a search war-
rant could not justify the warrantless entry into and seizure of a private
residence under the guise of exigent circumstances.,
'76
The facts giving rise to the warrantless entry and protective sweep
of the Mabry residence were derived from an undercover narcotics in-
vestigation which was conducted by the Albuquerque, New Mexico Po-
lice Department. That investigation consisted of several drug purchase
and sale transactions over the course of a month between an undercover
officer, Gonzales, and Rodger Sanders, co-defendant. During the
course of those transactions, Sanders would not reveal the identity of his
source, but did intimate to undercover officer Gonzales that his source
lived in nearby Tijeras, New Mexico.
7 7
On the morning of the defendants' arrests, Officer Gonzales met
with Sanders to discuss the purchase of a large quantity of cocaine. Af-
ter Sanders stated that he needed to call his source, Gonzales observed
and recorded the numbers that Sanders dialed. 7 8 By early afternoon,
the police learned that this telephone number belonged to the defend-
ant, John Mabry.
Two detectives went to survey and photograph the Mabry residence
that afternoon. By 7:00 p.m., a photograph of the Mabry residence was
made available to ten law enforcement detectives7 9 when they met to
plan their surveillance strategy for Gonzales' drug purchase that same
evening.
8 °
When Gonzales and another officer met with Sanders, a disagree-
ment over how much money should be paid in advance for the cocaine,
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (possession with intent to distribute cocaine); 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(l)(B) (distributing cocaine); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abet-
ting). Id. at 673.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 679-80.
75. The Mabrys raised a total of seven issues on appeal, and the court ruled in favor of
the Government on all seven issues.
76. Id. at 678 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 12, United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d
671 (10th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-2322).
77. Id. at 673-75.
78. Id.
79. Id. The photograph of the Mabry residence was attached to the affidavit in sup-
port of a search warrant. Id. at 689 (McKay, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
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and a desire by Gonzales to inspect some of the cocaine, caused Sanders
to make two trips to the Mabry residence between 9:00 p.m. and 10:30
p.m. During each trip, Sanders was observed by detectives driving up to
the Mabry residence and leaving.8 1
The police did not begin the process of obtaining a search warrant
for the Mabry home until after they arrested Sanders at 11:07 p.m. when
he returned from the Mabry residence with two ounces of cocaine.8 2 At
this time, the police also determined that there were exigent circum-
stances making it necessary for six officers to proceed to the Mabry
house in order to secure the home and its contents while awaiting the
search warrant.
8 3
Detective Gonzales was asked at trial why he did not obtain a search
warrant for the Mabry residence after he observed Sanders dialing the
telephone of John Mabry. He stated that he did not know who the con-
nection was or where the house was located, and therefore, probable
cause was not present.
8 4
D. Majority Opinion
The majority agreed that Officer Gonzales' observation of Sanders
calling the Mabry residence did not create sufficient probable cause to
justify the issuance of a search warrant for the Mabry house.8 5  More-
over, in determining the reasonableness of police activities, the majority
stated that courts must be sensitive to the nature of police investigations
and their public interest goals.
8 6
The objective of a drug investigation is to effect an undercover
transaction with a seller in such a manner that the seller will lead the
police to both the supplier and the contraband.8 7 In the instant case,
the court held it was perfectly proper that the police did not attempt to
obtain a search warrant until the source of the cocaine was established to the
satisfaction of the officers. 8 8 This did not come to pass until Sanders made
his last trip from the parking lot to the Mabry home, after Sanders had
been given money to bring back a portion of the one-half pound of
cocaine.
8 9
After the majority set the standard for obtaining a search warrant,
81. Id.
82. Id. at 690 (McKay, J., dissenting). Officers were dispatched to Albuquerque to
obtain a search warrant at approximately 11:30 p.m. The officers who secured the home
received the search warrant approximately two and one-half hours later, at 2:00 a.m. Id.
83. Id. at 674-75. The officers, experienced in drug transactions, feared that John
Mabry would get suspicious and destroy incriminating evidence when Sanders failed to
return.
84. Id. at 674.
85. Id. at 677. The majority merely stated that they agreed with Officer Gonzales, and
did not discuss why probable cause was lacking at this point.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (emphasis added). The majority appeared to be referring to the officers' actual




they focused on whether the officers' warrantless entry into the Mabry
home was supported by exigent circumstances. The court relied on
United States v. Cuaron9 ° by holding that the officers' fear, that Mabry
might grow suspicious about Sanders' failure to return, justified a war-
rantless entry into the Mabrys' home for the purpose of preventing the
destruction of evidence while a search warrant was being obtained.9 '
E. Dissent
In dissenting, Judge McKay suggested that although the majority
correctly quoted the Mabrys' chief contention on appeal, 92 the majority
failed to squarely confront this contention. 93 The court's decision fo-
cused entirely on the exigent circumstances which arose between the
time of the arrest of Sanders and the warrantless entry into Mabry's
home, and not the real issue of whether there was sufficient probable
cause far enough in advance of Sander's arrest that a warrant should
have been pursued prior to that time.
9 4
McKay asserted that it was not the function of a police officer to
determine whether there was sufficient probable cause to justify the issu-
ance of a warrant, because "the very person whose behavior is meant to
be circumscribed by the warrant requirement is the one who determines
whether a warrant should issue."19 5 This rule is particularly important,
McKay noted, when the rise of exigent circumstances is predictable and
inexorable.
96
McKay also argued that the majority's reliance on United States v.
Cuaron was misplaced because the issue in Cuaron was simply whether
the warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances, and not, as




Judge McKay, in dissent, was correct in asserting that the majority
90. 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983). In Cuaron, the officers in a clandestine drug inves-
tigation kept a surveillance on the route of a suspected drug seller to his source/supplier's
home one and one-half hours prior to the seller's arrest. The agents, as in the present
case, began efforts to obtain a search warrant for the home of the source/supplier,
Cuaron, after the seller's arrest. After waiting approximately 40 minutes, the officers pro-
ceeded to secure Cuaron's home before the search warrant was obtained. Id. at 585.
In upholding the officers' warrantless entry into Cuaron's home, the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit held that waiting to search does not necessarily remove the presence
of exigent circumstances, even if the officers may have waited long enough to obtain a
search warrant. Id. at 590 (citing United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1145 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)); see United States v.Johnson, 361 F.2d 832, 842, 844 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977)).
91. Wabry, 809 F.2d at 677-79.
92. See text accompanying notes 77-78.
93. 809 F.2d at 688-89 (McKay, J., dissenting).
94. Id. (McKay, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 692 (McKay, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 689 (McKay, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 694 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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did not address the Mabrys' chief contention, although it was correctly
cited by the court.9 8 The majority instead examined the presence of
exigent circumstances and concluded that its decision in Cuaron was dis-
positive.9 9 The court in Cuaron, however, addressed the issue of
whether exigent circumstances were present,10 0 and did not address the
issue of whether a warrantless search was excusable because probable
cause to obtain a warrant existed prior to the rise of exigent
circumstances.
As Judge McKay noted, there was no evidence presented by the
state as to why the officers had not made an attempt to obtain a warrant,
other than Officer Gonzales' assertion that he did not think he had prob-
able cause earlier in the afternoon.' 0 ' Thus, there was no evidence to
rebut the Mabrys' contention that probable cause existed as late as 7:00
that evening. Despite the absence of evidence, the majority concluded
that it was perfectly proper that the police did not attempt to obtain a
warrant until the source of the cocaine was established to the satisfaction
of the police. 10 2 The majority also failed to explain, as Judge McKay
noted in his dissent, why the officers could not have sought a warrant
earlier and waited to execute the warrant later in the day.10 3 As a result
of this case, the determination of whether probable cause exists is taken
away from the judiciary and left in the hands of the police. Such a result
is particularly disheartening in the instant case because exigent circum-
stances are almost always sure to arise in undercover drug
operations.1
0 4
98. The Mabrys contended that "the facts in possession of the police at least five
hours before the warrantless entry [of the Mabry residence] would have led any prudent
and trained officer to believe that there was a 'fair probability that contraband or evidence
of crime' would be found in the Mabry residence. Under the totality of the circumstances
of this case, the officers involved had probable cause to search the Mabry residence as
early as late afternoon on April 4, 1985, and no later than the strategy meeting at 7:00
p.m." Id. at 676-77 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 20-21, United States v. Mabry, 809
F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-2322) (citations omitted)); see also id. at 688 (McKay, J.,
dissenting).
99. In addressing the Mabrys' contention that probable cause existed prior to the exi-
gent circumstances, the court stated "[wie believe that this court, in United States v. Cuaron,
... effectively put this contention to rest." Id. at 678. The majority therefore believed that
Cuaron was controlling even though the Mabrys did not deny that exigent circumstances
were present.
100. Id. at 586. The chief contention of the defendant in Cuaron was that the police had
no objective basis to believe that destruction of criminal evidence was imminent: see also
Alabry, 809 F.2d at 694 (McKay, J., dissenting).
101. 809 F.2d at 691 (McKay, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 677 (McKay, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 693 (McKay J., dissenting).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Chavez, 812 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1987) (examples of how predictably the police can pro-
ceed without warrants due to the fear of the destruction of evidence, i.e. drugs).
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III. FIFTH AMENDMENT-MIRANDA WARNINGS AND
VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSIONS:
UNITED STATES V CHALAN
A. Overview
In United States v. Chalan, l0 5 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit elaborated on the definitions of custody for purposes of administer-
ing Miranda warnings and eliciting involuntary statements.
B. Background
1. Custodial Interrogation
In Miranda v. Arizona, 10 6 the Supreme Court held that the prosecu-
tion may not use statements derived from custodial interrogation 10 7 un-
less it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' 0 8 The Court
in Miranda explained the inherent threat of compulsion in custodial sur-
roundings and that statements obtained from suspects cannot truly be
the product of the suspect's free choice unless adequate warnings are
employed to dispel the compulsion. 10 9 Furthermore, the Court stated
that it would not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the de-
fendant was aware of his fifth amendment rights without a Miranda
warning being given.' 10 Thus, the Court laid down a blanket rule which
excludes all statements obtained from custodial interrogation unless it is
shown that the suspect received adequate warnings as to the availability
of the privilege prior to the questioning. I''
Since the compulsion of self-incrimination is derived from the cus-
todial surroundings and not necessarily the interrogation, statements
obtained from police interrogation are admissible so long as the suspect
was not in custody at the time of the questioning. 1 2 The Supreme
Court in Miranda stated that "[b]y custodial interrogation, we mean
105. 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987).
106. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Landmark decision whereby the Court set forth procedural
safeguards, now more commonly known as Miranda warnings, which must be followed by
police when subjecting suspects to "custodial interrogation").
107. See text accompanying note 115.
108. 384 U.S. at 458-65.
109. Id. at 457. Prior to Viranda, the admissibility of statements obtained from police
interrogation was generally determined by reference to the voluntariness of the statement,
in light of due process protection provided by the fourteenth amendment. See text ac-
companying notes 126-28.
110. 384 U.S. at 467-68.
111. Id. at 468 ("The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of
constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of
the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the de-
fendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given.").
112. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (suspect who voluntarily accompanied
police to station house after reporting a homicide was not in custody for purpose of Mi-
randa warnings when he was told that he was not under arrest and afterward was permitted
to leave); Oregon v, Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (burglary suspect who voluntarily
came to police station for questioning and then left without being arrested was not in
custody for purpose of Miranda warnings).
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questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way."' 13 Although the question of whether a person is in
custody is not very ambiguous, the latter part of the Court's definition of
custody-"otherwise deprived of his freedom"-has been the focus of
numerous decisions' 1 4 subsequent to Miranda.
The Supreme Court in Miranda alluded that an accused who was the
focus of an investigation must be given Miranda warnings, 15 but the
Court has since rejected such an interpretation of "custodial interroga-
tion.'" 116 Instead, the Court had stated that the ultimate inquiry in de-
ciding the custody question "is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest
or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a
formal arrest."' I 71n making this determination the Court has examined
"how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood
his situation."' 18
In Oregon v. Mathiason,' 19 the Court held that a suspect who "volun-
tarily" came to the police station in response to a police request was not
in custody, and was therefore not entitled to Miranda warnings.' 2 0 In
reversing the Oregon Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court
stated that a noncustodial situation was not converted to one in which
Miranda applies simply because the questioning took place in a coercive
environment. A formal arrest or "restraint on freedom of movement"
of the kind associated with a formal arrest must be present before Mi-
randa warnings are triggered, even though the questioning takes places
in a coercive environment.'
2 '
2. Voluntariness
The fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination prohibits
the admission of incriminating statements obtained by government acts,
threats, or promises which permit the defendant's will to be overborne
113. Mfiranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
114. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492
(1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324
(1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323
(1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
115. Mfiranda, 384 U.S. at 444 n.4.
116. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). The Court explicitly rejected
the defendant's argument that the mere fact that an investigation had "focused" on him
meant that he was entitled to Miranda warnings. See also United States v. Ellison, 791 F.2d
821, 823 (10th Cir. 1986).
117. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curium) (quoting Oregon
v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
118. MXcCarty, 468 U.S. at 442. "[A]n objective, reasonable-man test is appropriate be-
cause, unlike a subjective test, 'it is not solely dependent either on the self-serving declara-
tions of the police officers or the defendant nor does it place upon the police the burden of
anticipating the frailties or idiosyncracies of every person whom they question.' " Id. at
442 n.35 (summarizing and quoting People v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 9-10, 233 N.E.2d 255, 260,
286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233 (1967)).
119. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).




and thus rendered involuntary. 1 2 2 To determine whether a suspect's
statements are made voluntarily, a court examines the "totality of the
circumstances" including both the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation.1
2 3
Prior to Miranda, the admissibility of statements obtained from po-
lice interrogation was generally determined only by reference to the vol-
untariness of the statement. 124 The Miranda decision did not pre-empt
or alter the application of the voluntariness test; instead, the decision
merely added another variable into the admissibility of those confes-
sions obtained during custodial interrogation. 12 5 Statements made in-
voluntarily are still inadmissible, regardless of whether Miranda
warnings are given or were not required because the questioning did
not constitute "custodial interrogation." 1
2 6
Because the subjective nature of the "voluntariness" test prevents
any formulation of clear guidelines, the admissibility of confessions
must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The ultimate inquiry, how-
ever, is whether the confession was the product of free will. 12 7 If the
confession is not the product of free will, the confession will not be ad-
missible even though it appears to be reliable and not the result of con-
scious wrong doing by the interrogator. 12 8 Although no single factor is
determinative of the issue of voluntariness, the following factors are im-
portant when considering the "totality of the circumstances:" the na-
ture of the questioning, the length of interrogation, the number of
interrogators, the suspect's age, education and experience, and the use
of physical punishment.1
2 9
122. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1969); United States v. Fountain, 776 F.2d 878 (10th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Falcon, 766 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1985).
123. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), where the court stated:
"Some of the factors taken into account have included the youth of the accused,
his lack of education, or his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused
of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged
nature of the questioning, and the use of physical punishment such as the depri-
vation of food or sleep."
Id. at 226 (citations omitted). See also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961);
United States v. Fountain, 776 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Falcon, 766 F.2d
1469 (10th Cir. 1985).
124. The aim of this inquiry was to determine whether a suspect's right to due process
under.the fourteenth amendment had been violated. See, e.g., Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S.
293 (1963) (confession not admissible when obtained after suspect was given drug with
truth serum qualities); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (confession induced after
police pretended to arrest suspect's sick wife held not admissible).
125. Mfiranda directs that statements are to be excluded, regardless of their voluntari-
ness, if the statements were obtained during custodial interrogation and were not pre-
ceded by Miranda warnings.
126. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966).
127. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 225.
128. See Sam, 372 U.S. 293 (confession held involuntary, even though investigators
were unaware of truth serum qualities of drug which they gave to the defendant to sup-
press symptoms of withdrawal from heroin).
129. Buslamomle, 412 U.S. at 226; see supa note 124 (for the Court's language listing the
factors).
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C. Facts
Defendant Daniel Chalan, an adult Indian who lived on the Cochiti
Pueblo in New Mexico, was identified by a witness as being one of four
young Indian males seen near a convenience store at the time that it was
robbed and its assistant store manager shot and bludgeoned to
death. 3 0 The day after the robbery and murder, federal and local law
enforcement officers contacted Chalan through a message conveyed to
him by his mother, and asked him to meet them at the Pueblo Gover-
nor's office.
1 3 1
Chalan arrived at the Governor's office, accompanied by his
mother. At the beginning of the interview he was explicitly informed
that he did not have to answer any questions, that he was not a suspect
in the case, and that the officers merely wanted him to provide them with
information.' 3 2 The questioning, however, was often accusatory, and
the investigators,133 the Governor, and Chalan's mother exhorted him
to tell the truth.
At no time during the interview was Chalan arrested or given any
Miranda warnings. After approximately one and one-half hours of ques-
tioning, the interview ended and Chalan departed without ever admitting to
any participation in the robbery and murder.
13 4
The day after the interview at the Pueblo Governor's office, Chalan
spoke with several of his cousins about the murder and robbery and de-
cided to discuss the crimes with the law enforcement officers again. An
FBI agent came to the home of Chalan's cousin after Chalan asked his
relative to summon the Bureau. When the agent arrived, Chalan con-
fessed to having committed the crimes before the agent had asked
Chalan any questions. 13 5 The agent then informed Chalan of his Mi-
randa rights and Chalan signed a written waiver-of-rights form and then
gave a detailed confession, which was later reduced to writing and
signed. 13 6 The confession occurred approximately twenty-two and one-
half hours after Chalan was questioned the day before at the Pueblo
Governor's office. 1
3 7
At the suppression hearing preceding the trial, Chalan sought to
exclude both his confession made to the FBI agent and his statements
made the day before at the Pueblo Governor's office. Chalan argued
that he was subjected to custodial interrogation at the Pueblo Gover-
130. United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 1987).
131. Id. at 1305.
132. Id. The officers wanted to know whether Chalan knew anything about the crimes
at the convenience store.
133. Chalan was questioned by an FBI agent, two investigators from the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, and an officer from the local sheriff's department. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. The court did not state what Chalan said specifically.
136. Id.
137. Id. rhe time frame of the confession sheds light on the validity of Chalan's claim
that he was still operating under coercion that allegedly was placed on him at the Gover-
nor's office. As more time transpires between the questioning and confession, there is less
likelihood that the coercive questioning caused the subsequent confession.
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nor's office without first being admonished of his constitutional rights in
violation of Miranda. Specifically, Chalan argued that his attendance at
the interview was compelled by tribal custom, which demands he not
refuse a request by the Pueblo Governor to come to his office and which
requires him to remain until dismissed.
138
Alternatively, Chalan argued that his statements at the Pueblo Gov-
ernor's office were made involuntarily because his mother, the investiga-
tors, and the Governor exhorted him to tell the truth. Furthermore, he
argued that the confession made the following day was also given
involuntarily.
D. Tenth Circuit Opinion
1. Custody
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that
Chalan could not reasonably have believed that he was in custody during
the interview at the Pueblo Governor's office.'139 Chalan's argument
that his attendance at the interview was compelled by tribal custom was
also rejected by the court. 14 0 The court stated that it was unconvinced
that the Governor's influence sufficiently restrained Chalan's freedom so
as to necessitate the safeguards required by Miranda, although Chalan
had presented evidence at the suppression hearing that suggested that
obedience to the Governor is expected of all tribal members.
14 1
As in Mathiason v. Oregon,14 2 the court apparently was not influenced
by the coercive and accusatory nature of the interview. 14 3 The determi-
native factor was that Chalan came to the interview voluntarily and was
free to leave at anytime. 1
4 4
2. Voluntariness
The court assessed the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding
Chalan's statements at the Governor's office by examining the personal
characteristics of Chalan and the details of the investigation, and con-
138. Id. at 1307.
139. Id.; see also United States v. Ellison, 791 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1986) (when reviewing
denial of motion to suppress, trial court's findings of fact must be accepted unless clearly
erroneous).
140. 812 F.2d at 1307.
141. Id. In addition to being in charge of the Pueblo police force, the Governor is the
head of the Pueblo and presides over the tribal council.
142. 429 U.S. 492 (1977). The defendant in Mathiason had been asked to come to the
police station to discuss his involvement in a recent burglary. While at the police station, a
detective lied to Mathiason by stating that Mathiason's finger prints had been found at the
scene of the burglary, when in fact no finger prints were found. Thereafter, Mathiason
confessed to committing the burglary, but he was not arrested, and after further question-
ing was allowed to leave. Id. at 493-94.
The Supreme Court held that Mathiason was not in custody despite the coercive envi-
ronment in which the questioning took place. The important fact, stated the Court, was
simply whether Mathiason was free to leave during the questioning. Id. at 495.
143. Chalan, 812 F.2d at 1307.
144. Id. at 1307-08.
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cluded that Chalan's statements were made voluntarily.14 5 In regard to
the details of the investigation, the court noted that Chalan's consistent
denial of any participation in the crimes throughout the interview indi-
cated that his free will was not overburdened by the questioning. 14 6 In
addition, although all those present at the Governor's office exhorted
Chalan to tell the truth, he was specifically informed at the beginning of
the interview that he was not obligated to answer any questions. Finally,
the court interpreted the presence of Chalan's mother throughout the
interview as an indication that the interview was not unduly coercive. 147
With respect to Chalan's personal characteristics, the court noted
that he was not uneducated and that he also had experience with law
enforcement procedures both as an officer for the Pueblo Police Depart-
ment and as a prior arrestee.
148
Chalan's confession was also examined, even though the court had
already found that he was not subjected to undue coercion at the Gover-
nor's office. 149 The court noted that twenty-two hours had elapsed be-
tween his confession and the interview at the Governor's office and that,
during this time, Chalan did not have any contact with the police. More-
over, Chalan initiated the contact and spontaneously confessed to the
crimes upon seeing the FBI agent. 150 Finally, the court found the
signed waiver form as strong proof of the voluntariness of Chalan's
waiver to remain silent prior to confessing. 
15 1
E. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit aptly applied Supreme Court precedent in con-
cluding that Chalan was not subjected to "custodial interrogation" at
the Pueblo Governor's office. Although Chalan was asked by the police
to come to the Governor's office, and the interrogation was often coer-
cive and accusatory, the only relevant inquiry was whether there was a
formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associ-
ated with a formal arrest.152 The coercive nature of the environment in
which the questioning took place was irrelevant for purposes of Miranda
warnings, so long as Chalan remained free to leave. 1 53
It was also correct for the Tenth Circuit to reject Chalan's argument
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1308.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1305. Chalan was 22 years old at the time of the investigation and had at-
tended some college. He also had been arrested twice and had earlier worked approxi-
mately one year as a law enforcement officer for the Pueblo.
149. Note that Chalan argued that his confession was involuntary because the coercion
used in the interview was still operating when he made his confession the next day. Thus,
it appears that the court's further examination of Chalan's confession was unnecessary,
since the court had already found that the interview was not coercive.
150. Id. at 1308.
151. Id. (citing United States v. Fountain, 776 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1985)).
152. See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam); Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)(per curiam).
153. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 ("[A] noncustodial situation is not converted to one
in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the
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that his attendance at the Governor's office was compelled because, by
tribal custom, he could not refuse the invitation. If the court did not
reject this argument, then any citizen who is asked to come to the police
station could argue that his sense of civic duty compelled his attendance,
and that he therefore could be considered "in custody" for the purpose
of Miranda warnings. Such a result would be contrary to the Supreme
Court's desire to limit Miranda to formal arrests or restrictions on free-
dom of movements of the degree associated with arrests.
15 4
In regard to the voluntariness of Chalan's statements, the court was
correct in concluding that Chalan was not subjected to undue coercion
at the Governor's office. Since the ultimate inquiry in examining "vol-
untariness" is to determine whether the suspect's will was
overburdened, Chalan's consistent denials illustrate that his will was not
overburdened, even though all those present exhorted him to tell the
truth.




In Phillips v. Murphy, 155 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that habeas corpus petitioners are not entitled to evidentiary hearings in
federal court, when their applications are supported by allegations that
are vague and conclusory, and are wholly incredible in the face of the
record.
B. Background
Federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings are empowered to
provide trial-like proceedings in which the court may receive evidence
and try the facts anew. 156 Indeed, in Townsend v. Sain 157 the Supreme
Court held that this exercise of power by the federal courts is mandatory
when the habeas applicant has not received a full and fair evidentiary
hearing in state court.
158
The Supreme Court elaborated in Blackledge v. Allison,159 however,
absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took
place in a 'coercive environment.' ").
154. See Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1124.
155. 796 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1986).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1985); see also Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). "The
whole history of the writ-its unique development-refutes a construction of the federal
courts' habeas corpus powers that would assimilate their task to that of courts of appellate
review." Id. at 311.
157. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
158. Id. at 312. The defendant in Townsend had been injected with a drug to suppress
symptoms of withdrawal from heroin before confessing. The defendant was then denied
an opportunity in state court to present evidence that the drug had "truth serum" qualities
which caused his confession to be involuntary Id. at 321-22.
159. 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
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that it would be unwise to allow hearings in all federal post-conviction
proceedings, 160 and that finality in the sentencing process should be
sought for the good of the prisoner and the court. 16 1 It was recognized
that many collateral attacks may be inspired by " 'a mere desire to be
freed temporarily from the confines of the prison.' ",162 Despite the
concern, the Court stated that the habeas corpus applicant in Blackledge
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the allegations were not
vague and conclusory but were supported by specific facts. 163 The criti-
cal question, explained the Court, was whether these allegations, when
viewed against the record of the plea hearing, were so "palpably incredi-
ble," so "patently frivolous or false," as to warrant summary
dismissal. 164
C. Facts
The petitioner pleaded guilty in two separate state cases 165 and, af-
ter a pre-sentence investigation, received sentences totaling eighty-five
years.1 6 6 In so pleading, the petitioner was subjected to extensive in-
quiry by the state district court judge to determine whether the guilty
pleas were voluntary and informed. 16 7 After sentencing, petitioner
160. Id. at 71.
161. Id. The defendant can then focus on rehabilitation, and the courts conserve vital
resources, such as court time and the expense of revisiting judgments.
162. Id. at 72 (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 284-85 (1948)).
163. Id. at 75-76. The petitioner in Blackledge sought habeas corpus relief on the
ground that his guilty plea was involuntary due to an unkept plea agreement. At the state
arraignment, the petitioner had entered a guilty plea by responding to form questions on
an "adjudication form." One of the form questions asked petitioner whether he under-
stood that he could be sentenced up to life, while another asked whether anyone had made
any promises that would influence his plea of guilty. Petitioner was required to only write
no or yes, and there were no other records or transcripts of the arraignment. Id. at 66 n. 1.
Three days after his guilty plea, petitioner was sentenced to 17 to 21 years imprison-
ment. Thereafter, petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in federal district court claiming
that his guilty plea was induced by his attorney's promise that he would get only a 10 year
sentence. The petitioner elaborated on his claim with specific factual allegations, indicat-
ing exactly what the terms of the promise were; when, where, and by whom it had been
made; and the identity of a witness to its communication. Id. at 76-77.
The federal district court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing and
held that the printed "form" was conclusive evidence that petitioner's guilty plea was vol-
untary. The dismissal was reversed by the Fourth Circuit. Blackledge v. Allison, 553 F.2d
894 (4th Cir. 1976).
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's reversal by holding that the district
court could not fairly adopt a per se rule excluding all possibility that a defendant's repre-
sentations on the record at the time his guilty plea was accepted were so much the product
of such factors as misunderstanding, duress, or misrepresentation by others as to make the
guilty plea a constitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 76.
The Court stated that a petition can be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing when
the allegations are vague or conclusory, but not when the petitioner elaborates on his
claim with specific factual allegations. Id. at 76-77.
164. Id. at 76.
165. Phillips v. Murphy, 796 F.2d 1303, 1303 (1986). The petitioner was charged in
C.R.F. 80-346 with lewd molestation of a minor. In C.R.F. 80-653, he was charged with
one count of robbery with a firearm, one count of first-degree rape, three counts of sod-
omy and two counts of kidnapping for extortion.
166. Id. Petitioner was sentenced to five years imprisonment in C.R.F. 80-346 and 80
years imprisonment in C.R.F. 80-653 to be served consecutively.
167. Id. at 1304-05. The state court asked the petitioner in open court whether he was
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sought state relief claiming that his guilty pleas were neither voluntary
nor intelligently made because he was operating under the impression
that the district attorney had agreed to recommend a forty year sentence
in exchange for his guilty pleas.'
68
The state court denied the petitioner's application for state post-
conviction relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The same
state district court judge that had questioned the petitioner before ac-
cepting his guilty pleas also ruled on the petitioner's motion for post-
conviction relief. The state court judge concluded that, in light of the
record and prior proceedings, the matter was a question of law and did
not require an evidentiary hearing. 169
Thereafter, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,170 petitioner brought a
petition in federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. The district
court dismissed petitioner's petition by order without an evidentiary
hearing and petitioner appealed. 171 In addition to his original claim for
post-conviction relief, the petitioner argued on appeal that he should
have received an evidentiary hearing because his post-conviction pro-
ceeding raised material issues of fact.
172
D. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that, if the facts are in dispute and
the habeas corpus applicant does not receive a full and fair evidentiary
hearing in state court, the applicant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
in federal court.17 3 However, the applicant is not entitled to an eviden-
tiary hearing when his assertions are wholly incredible in the face of the
record. '
74
aware of the following: the court was advised that there were no negotiations between the
District Attorney's office and his lawyers, whereby there would be any recommended sen-
tence to be presented to the court; that the sentence would be left to the discretion of the
court; and that the defendant in the related case who was charged conjointly with the
petitioner in C.R.F. 80-653 (alleging robbery with a firearm, first degree rape, sodomy,
and kidnapping for extortion) received a 70 year sentence and that the court would proba-
bly take that verdict into consideration in determining the petitioner's sentence.
The court also asked whether he was entering his plea of guilty due to any force, or
threats or inducements made to him by any officer, attorney, or anyone else. Id.
168. Id. Since the petitioner stated in court that his guilty plea was not induced by any
promises, the assumption must be that petitioner argues he responded negatively in order
to receive a lower sentence.
Petitioner also argued that his guilty pleas should be set aside because he was not
placed under oath at the time of the plea proceedings. The Fifth Circuit has a supervisory
rule which requires that defendants be placed under oath when the court inquiries as to
plea agreements. See Coody v. United States, 470 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated, 588
F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
The Tenth Circuit declined to adopt such a rule and noted that no constitutional basis
for the procedural rule was intimated by the Fifth Circuit in Coody. Thus, in the Tenth
Circuit, statements made in open court during plea proceedings are accepted even when
the defendant is not placed under oath.
169. 796 F.2d at 1305.
170. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
171. 796 F.2d. at 1305.
172. Id. at 1303.
173. Id. at 1304 (citing Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)).
174. Id. (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)) ("Solemn declarations in
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The court reviewed the record and findings from the plea proceed-
ings and concluded that the petitioner's assertion that the district attor-
ney was to recommend a forty year sentence was wholly incredible.175 The
court noted that the petitioner was aware of statements in the plea pro-
ceedings indicating there were no negotiations on the sentence and that
the judge's sentencing decision would be influenced by a seventy-seven
year sentence given to another defendant charged conjointly with the
petitioner. 176 Thus, since the petitioner's assertion was found to be
"wholly incredible," he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in fed-
eral court, even though he alleged factual disputes and did not receive
the hearing in state court.'
7 7
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit held that the state district court's
finding that the plea was entered without negotiations with the office of
the district attorney was a historical fact 178 subject to a habeas corpus
presumption of correctness standard. Thus the petitioner was not free
to contest this finding in federal court unless he met the requirements of
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 179 Although the ultimate question-whether a
open court carry a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of con-
clusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are con-
tentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible."). See text accompanying
note 166.
175. 796 F.2d at 1305.
176. Id. The court also noted that petitioner did not attempt to support his allegations
with specifics as to when or how such an understanding between him and the district attor-
ney was made.
177. Id.
178. The factual circumstances surrounding a habeas corpus petitioner's claim are de-
termined by the state court. See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036-40 (1984).
179. Section D states:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a
determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State
court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ
and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written
finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be
presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise
appear, or the respondent shall admit-
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State
court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not ade-
quate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court
hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the
person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of
his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State
court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the
State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State
court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which
the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of
the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced
as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part
of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly
supported by the record ....
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challenged confession was obtained in a manner compatible with the
Constitution-is generally a matter for independent federal determina-
tion, 180 the court found that here the historical fact was dispositive of
petitioner's claim for federal habeas relief.181
E. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Phillips was dictated by Blackledge v.
Allison, 18 2 in which the Supreme Court made it clear that summary dis-
missal is appropriate when habeas corpus petitioners state vague and
conclusory allegations.18 3 The petitioner in Phillips failed to include any
factual allegations which would support his claim that the district attor-
ney had agreed to recommend a lower sentence in exchange for his plea.
Philips summary dismissal was therefore appropriate, unlike in Blackledge
where the petitioner alleged exactly what the terms of the alleged un-
kept promise was, who it had been made by, when and where it had been
made, and the identity of a witness to the communication. 184 As a result
of Philips, it is clear that future habeas corpus petitioners will be subject
to summary dismissal unless they include factual allegations in the peti-
tion to support their claims.
V. PROSECUTOR'S DuTy TO DISCLOSE FAVORABLE EVIDENCE:
BoWEx V. MAINARD
A. Overview
The framework for evaluating the materiality of undisclosed evi-
dence has recently been changed by the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Bagley.' 8 5 The Tenth Circuit, in recently decided Bowen v.
Maynard,18 6 held that the standard set forth in Bagley is satisfied if the
materiality of the undisclosed information meets both standards of
United States v. Agurs. 187
B. Background
In Brady v. Maryland,'8 8 the Supreme Court held that "the suppres-
sion by the prosecution of requested evidence favorable to an accused
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
180. 796 F.2d at 1305 (citing Mitter v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985)). While the habeas
corpus court is not free to challenge the facts found by the state court, it can disagree with
the state's legal conclusions based on those facts.
181. Id. Since the petitioner's claim of involuntariness was based on the assertion that
the district attorney agreed to recommend a lower sentence, the claim was disposed of by
the state court's finding of fact that there were no negotiations conducted with the district
attorney.
182. 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
183. See text accompanying notes 161-66,
184. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
185. 473 U.S 667 '(1985).
186. 799 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1986).
187. 427 U.S 97 (1976).
188. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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punishment.. 189 Such evidence is commonly referred to as Brady
evidence.1 90
The law has recently been changed, however, with respect to the
framework for evaluating the materiality of Brady evidence. Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Bagley,' 9 the materiality of
evidence was judged according to three distinct standards enunciated in
Agurs. 19 2 These three Agurs standards were replaced with one standard
in Bagley, 19 3 but it is yet to be determined whether Bagley will be applied
retroactively. 1
9 4
The Tenth Circuit did not determine in Bowen whether Bagley
should be applied retroactively; rather, they examined the standards set
forth in Agurs. The applicability of the Agurs standards was dependent
upon the factual circumstances of each case. First, where the prosecu-
tion knew or should have known that its case included perjured testi-
mony, the conviction would be overturned if there was any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the
jury. 19 5 Second, where defense counsel requests disclosure of specific
evidence, the request puts the prosecution on notice of its obligation to
disclose, and the verdict therefore has to be set aside if the suppressed
evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial. 19 6 This test is
commonly referred to as the "lower" Agurs standard. Third, where the
prosecution received no request or a general request for all Brady mate-
rial, 19 7 the judgment would be set aside if the omitted evidence created
a reasonable doubt that would not otherwise have existed.' 9 8 This last test
is commonly referred to as the "strict" Agurs standard.
In Bagley the Court replaced the three Agurs standards of material-
ity with one single test to be applied in all instances of nondisclosure.
The Court held that evidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different. 199 "Reasonable probability" was
defined as probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.20 0
189. Id. at 87. Impeachment evidence also falls within the protection of the Brady rule,
if its suppression would deprive the defendant of a fair trial. See Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150 (1972).
190. See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972).
191. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
192. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
194. Bagley was decided while Bowen was on appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Since the
Tenth Circuit found that the withheld material satisfied both of the applicable Agurs tests
of materiality, it held that there was no need to determine whether the unitary test of
Bagley should be applied retroactively. Bowen, 799 F.2d at 603.
195. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-04.
196. Id. at 104.
197. A general request does not give the prosecution notice of any specific obligation,
and therefore is treated as though no request was made. Id. at 112.
198. Id.
199. 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); see also id. at 685 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and
Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and in judgment).




Defendant Clifford Bowen was convicted of three counts of first de-
gree murder, 20 ' in charges stemming from a notorious triple homicide
in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, known as the "Guest House Murders."
The three victims were shot at the Guest House Hotel while sitting
around a poolside table late at night. 20 2 The State's theory of the crime
was that Bowen was hired by a local drug dealer, Harold Behrens, 20 3 to
kill one of Behrens' conspirators, Ray Peters, whom Behrens feared
would turn informant in light of pending drug charges.
20 4
The evidence used to convict Bowen consisted primarily of testi-
mony by two witnesses who testified that they saw Bowen in the pool
area before the shooting, and that after gunshots were heard, they saw
Bowen run and flee in a waiting vehicle. In defense, Bowen claimed that
he was not in Oklahoma when the murders occurred, and offered twelve
witnesses who testified that he was at a rodeo in Tyler, Texas until mid-
night on that night.
2 0 5
After Bowen was convicted, his attorneys learned that earlier in the
investigation the police had an initial prime suspect, Lee Crowe, who
resembled Bowen in physical appearance. 20 6 Based on this information,
the defense attorneys motioned for a new trial claiming that the prose-
cution withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense in violation of
the Brady rule.2 0 7 Furthermore, the defense attorneys stated that prior
to trial, they had made a specific oral request to the prosecution to pro-
201. Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 595 (10th Cir. 1986). At trial, Bowen received
death sentences on each count. His convictions were affirmed on appeal and the court set
his execution for August 12, 1985. See Bowen v. Oklahoma, 715 P.2d 1093 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1984), cert denied, 473 U.S. 911 (1985).
202. Bowen, 799 F.2d at 596-98.
203. Id. Behrens was formerly a detective in the organized crime detail of the
Oklahoma City Police Department. He became a suspect when his former supervisor,
Detective Sergeant David McBride, recognized the circulated description of the gunman as
being someone who Behrens had investigated while on the force. The supervisor recalled
that toward the later stages of the investigation, Behrens quit the department and shortly
thereafter Bowen was no longer seen in Oklahoma City. Id. at 597.
204. Shortly before the shooting, Behrens and his lover Herman Borden had been sit-
ting at the poolside table with Peters and the two other murder victims. Upon leaving the
table, Behrens put his hand on Peters' shoulder and said he would see him tomorrow. A
former lover of Behrens testified at trial that it was not Behrens' custom to make physical
contact with people upon parting company. The State contended that Behrens' gesture
"fingered" Peters for the hit man. Id. at 598-99.
205. Id.
206. Lee Crowe was employed as a police officer in Hanahan, South Carolina, at the
time of the murders. Both Crowe and Bowen fit the description of the shooter: white, six
feet two inches tall, 225 pounds, salt and pepper hair, beer belly, and pale complexion. Id.
at 600.
Crowe also habitually carried a .45 caliber pistol with unusual and expensive silver-
tipped hollow point ammunition; the type found at the scene of the murders. Id. at 599,
600 n.2.
Bowen's lawyers became aware of Crowe when they were contacted by South Carolina
law enforcement agents who suspected that Crowe was a hit man for organized crime. Not
until the first day of the federal hearings (five years after Bowen's convictions) did Bowen's
attorneys discover the full extent of information which the state had concerning Lee
Crowe. Id. at 602. See infia note 216.
207. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY 14 W REVIEW
duce any information concerning other suspects. As a result of the non-
disclosure, the defense attorneys argued that the materiality of the
undisclosed information might have affected the outcome of the trial
and should be judged by the lower Agurs standard.
208
Following an evidentiary hearing to determine the materiality of the
withheld information, the state court concluded that the withheld infor-
mation did not warrant a reversal of Bowen's convictions.2 0 9 The state
court applied the stricter Agurs standard2 10 and found that the evidence
did not undermine the confidence of the guilty verdict. 2 1 1 It is not clear
from the state court record, however, whether the court found that no
oral request was made or whether the court simply held that Brady re-
quests must be in writing in order to trigger the stricter Agurs
standard.
2 12
After the motion for post-conviction relief was denied in state court,
Bowen sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to 28
U.S.C § 2254.213 Before the petition was addressed by the federal
court, Bowen's attorneys obtained police investigative reports from the
prosecution 2 14 which further implicated the earlier suspect, Lee Crowe.
Bowen argued to the federal court that the Lee Crowe material was ex-
culpatory within the meaning of Brady because it could have been used
to impeach witnesses and because it cast doubt on his guilt.
2 15
The federal district court held hearings and determined first that
the prosecution had in fact received an oral request from Bowen's attor-
208. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
209. 799 F.2d at 603.
210. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
211. 799 F.2d at 601-02.
212. If the court had found that no oral request had been made, this finding would
have been a "historical fact" entitled to a presumption of correctness by the federal court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1985); see also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963).
213. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). For a general discussion of habeas corpus proceedings
and the purpose of the writ, see Hutson v. Justices of Wareham Dist. Court, 552 F. Supp.
974 (D. Mass. 1982) (remedy is available only when circumstances are presented which
demonstrate fundamental unfairness in trial, or the infringement of important constitu-
tional rights).
214. 799 F.2d at 615-18. These reports revealed that Ray Peters, who was considered
by police to be the prime target of the murders, was divorced and that his former wife,
Patsy Peters, was engaged to Crowe. Patsy and Crowe lived in Hanahan, South Carolina,
along with another woman, Deana Burns. Crowe provided protection in their apartment
while Patsy and Deana worked as prostitutes.
Ray Peters' mother, Mae Margraves, recalled that Ray had phoned Patsy a week before
his death and had told her not to come out to Oklahoma City because he did not want to
see her but only his children. He threatened Patsy by telling her that if she came out to
Oklahoma he would tell her parents that she was a prostitute. Id.
The reports also revealed that South Carolina authorities suspected Crowe to be a hit
man, and that on several occasions Crowe had left South Carolina and, upon his return, it
was discovered that a homicide had occurred where he had been. Crowe had also been a
suspect in a murder unrelated to organized crime. Crowe's former girlfriend had a boy-
friend who persisted in bothering her. The boyfriend was later found dead with five bullet
wounds in the head. When Crowe was asked to produce his gun, he said that he lost it. Id.
Finally, the reports revealed that Crowe and Patsy were in Oklahoma on the day of the
murders and that Crowe's exact whereabouts at the time of the murders were undeter-
mined. Id.
215. Id. at 610.
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neys for prior suspects.2 16 The court then applied the lower Agurs stan-
dard to the withheld evidence, including the police investigative reports
which were not before the state court, and held that Bowen's convictions
were constitutionally invalid.2 17 The State appealed, claiming that the
withheld material was not exculpatory within the meaning of Brady.
D. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit held that the prosecution had a federal constitu-
tional duty to reveal the Lee Crowe material either with or without a
specific request by the defense. In holding that the withheld material
met both applicable Agurs tests, 2 18 the court declined to determine
whether the unitary test 2 19 of Bagley should be applied retroactively.
220
The court first examined the district court's finding of an oral re-
quest for other suspects, and concluded that the finding was supported
by both federal and state court records and was not clearly errone-
ous. 2 2 1 The decision then stated that a specific oral request which is not
on the record is legally equivalent to a formal, written motion for pur-
poses of the prosecution's duty to disclose favorable evidence. The oral
request gives the prosecution specific notice of exactly what the defense
desires.
2 22
The court then noted that the State's case against Bowen was based
upon testimony of two identification witnesses, whose testimony may
not have been flawless. 22 3 Lee Crowe's marked resemblance to the de-
scription of the suspect could have been used by the defense to impeach
the witness' identifications of Bowen. 2 24 Furthermore, the opinion
noted that the police reports documenting the connection between Lee
Crowe and one of the victims to organized crime in South Carolina
216. Id. at 605-06. During questioning by the court, the prosecution conceded that an
oral request had been received from Bowen's attorneys. This concession overcame any
presumption of correctness, to the extent that the state record could be interpreted to
include a court finding that no oral request had been made, and thus a historical fact
entitled to a presumption of correctness. Id. at 609.
217. Id. at 613.
218. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
220. 799 F.2d at 603.
221. Id. at 607.
222. Id. at 603. The standard for judging the materiality of information not disclosed
after a specific request is lower than the standard for evaluating the materiality of nonre-
quested information because the specific denial has a greater affect on strategic decisions.
Thus, in the absence of any specific denial by the prosecution that there were no prior
suspects, the defense is less likely to pursue that line of inquiry than if they had never
requested such information. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1985)
("the more specifically the defense requests certain evidence. . . the more reasonable it is
for the defense to assume from the nondisclosure that the evidence does not exist, and to
make pretrial and trial decisions on the basis of this assumption.").
223. 799 F.2d at 611. One witness had only viewed the suspect from a distance of 85
feet, and the other witness had undergone hypnosis to sharpen her memory before trial
and had possibly misidentified a police detective in a live line up.
224. Id. at 610. See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (suppression of
evidence which could be used to impeach witnesses violates the Constitution iW it deprives
the defendant of a fair trial).
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would have alerted the defense to focus on the motive, opportunity, and
ability to kill of Lee Crowe.2 25 Therefore, the Crowe material would
have been invaluable in undermining the identifications of the
witnesses.
22 6
The court further held that the Crowe material cast doubt not only
upon the testimony of witnesses, but on Bowen's guilt. The court re-
jected the State's argument that Moore v. Illinois2 27 was controlling, be-
cause unlike the instant case, there was no evidence in Moore that the
undisclosed prior suspect had any opportunity, motive, or ability to kill
the victim.2 2 8 In contrast, Lee Crowe was a suspected hit man living
with the ex-wife of one of the victims and was visiting Oklahoma at the
time of the murders. In addition, Bowen offered twelve witnesses who
said that he was in Tyler, Texas, at the time of the murders. Further-
more, the only supportable motive Bowen could have to commit the
murders was money, but the prosecution offered no proof that Bowen
received any payment.
2 29
While it was admittedly within the province of the jury to weigh the
credibility of Bowen's alibi, the court concluded that the jury would have
viewed Bowen's alibi differently had it been given the opportunity to
learn of Lee Crowe's existence. 230 The court held therefore that the
stricter Agurs test, 2 3 ' in addition to the lower test, had been met because




The Tenth Circuit's decision in Bowen v. Maynard illustrates the
complex application of the Agurs standards. These standards require
that the court first make factual determinations as to the circumstances
giving rise to the nondisclosure before evaluating the materiality of the
withheld information.2 3 3 The complexity of applying these standards is
compounded by the court's decision in Bowen, because it means that re-
viewing courts cannot rely just on the record for determining what mate-
rial was or was not requested by the defense. It is clear from the court's
decision that the courts must conduct factual inquiries to determine
whether or not certain oral requests were received by the prosecution
and, if so, what was the nature and scope of the information requested.
The Supreme Court's replacement of the Agurs standards with the
unitary standard set forth in Bagley will probably not reduce the type of
225. 799 F.2d at 611.
226. Id.
227. 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
228. 799 F.2d at 611.
229. Id. at 612.
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
232. 799 F.2d at 612.
233. The factual circumstances surrounding discovery requests determine what Agurs
standard will be applied. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
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extensive fact finding illustrated in Bowen. 2 34 Justice Blackmun, joined
by Justice O'Connor, stated in Bagley that a specific request by the de-
fense for certain evidence should be taken into account in applying the
unitary standard.2 3 5 The Bagley Court recognized that an incomplete
response to a specific request not only deprives the defense of certain
evidence, but also has the effect of representing to the defense that the
evidence does not exist.2 3 6 This in turn may cause the defense to rely
on this misleading representation and abandon lines of independent in-
vestigations, defenses, or trial strategies that it might otherwise have
pursued.
23 7
Thus, although the court in Bowen applied the Agursstandards, the
future application of the unitary Bagley standard will be affected by the
holding in Bowen that oral requests for discovery are equivalent to writ-
ten requests.
Steve Louth
234. See Bowen, 799 F.2d at 613 (reviewing the lower court proceedings and record of
oral arguments to determine whether an oral request for prior suspects was received bv
the prosecution); see also supra note 214 (for applicability of Agurs standards).
235. Baglev, 473 U.S. at 683-84.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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